

## Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 195356 TOSEC 200093

FOLLOWING REPEAT CONAKRY 1538 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ABIDJAN BONN  
DAKAR MOSCOW PARIS 03 AUG 76

QUOTE S E C R E T CONAKRY 1538

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR EAID MILI GV SG IV

SUBJ: SOVIET TU95 SURVEILLANCE DEPLOYMENT AND GUINEAN  
SECURITY PARANOIA

REF: CONAKRY 1483 (NOTAL)-POUCHING TO PARIS AND BONN

1. SUMMARY. GOG, RESPONDING TO US REQUESTS, HAS  
PROVIDED FORMAL ASSURANCE THAT SOVIET TU95D DEPLOY-  
MENTS WILL CEASE AFTER AUGUST 1976. HOWEVER, GOG RE-  
QUESTS US QUOTE SECURITY GUARANTY UNQUOTE AGAINST  
ATTACK FROM SENEGAL AND IVORY COAST. DISCONTINUANCE  
OF SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE AGAINST THE US ATLANTIC FLEET  
FROM GUINEAN AIRFIELDS IS A POSITIVE AND PROMISING  
DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD BE FIRST STEP IN DIMINUTION  
OF SOVIET MILITARY ACCESS TO ATLANTIC THROUGH  
GUINEA. RECOMMEND US SEEK MOST SUITABLE FASHION TO  
SHOW WE ARE SENSITIVE IN TURN TO GUINEAN SECURITY  
FEARS, HOWEVER FANCIFUL THEY MAY BE. FURTHER RECOM-  
MEND THAT US PREPARE TIMELY REWARD IN FY77 PL 480  
DELIVERIES . END SUMMARY

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2. MOUSSA DIAKITE, MINISTER OF DOMAINE INTERIOR/SECURITY

JUSTICE AND PRESIDENT OF STATE COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH AMERICAS, CONVOKED ME EVENING JULY 30. FLANKED BY MINDEFENSE ALAPHAIX KOUROUMA, MININTERIOR AND SECURITY KEIRA KARIM, AND STATE COMMITTEE SECGEN SEKOU CAMARA, DIAKITE MADE FOLLOWING FORMAL PRESENTATION:

A. PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE WISHED UNITED STATES TO KNOW GOG POSITION REGARDING SOVIET SURVEILLANCE DEPLOYMENTS AND REGARDING GUINEAN NATIONAL SECURITY. TU95D DEPLOYMENTS WERE REQUESTED IN 1973 BY GOG FOLLOWING CABRAL ASSASSINATION WHEN GUINEA FEARED ANOTHER INVASION BY SEA. PURPOSE OF PERIODIC SOVIET MISSIONS HAS BEEN TO SURVEY WATERS SURROUNDING GUINEA. WHEN US AMBASSADOR FIRST COMPLAINED OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EARLY 1976 PRESIDENT THOUGHT THESE DEPLOYMENTS HAD ALREADY ENDED. IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO NEED FOR SUCH SOVIET ASSISTANCE IF USG HAD PROTECTED GUINEA FROM FOREIGN ATTACK.

B. THERE WOULD NEVER BE FOREIGN BASES ON GUINEAN SOIL. GUINEA WAS DETERMINED TO PURSUE ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE AND REAL NONALIGNMENT VIS-A VIS SUPER POWER RIVALRY. HOWEVER, GOG WAS NOT TECHNICALLY CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING ACTIVITIES OF ANY FOREIGN AIRCRAFT ONCE IT DEPARTED CONAKRY. AFTER AUGUST 1976, TU95D DEPLOYMENTS WOULD CEASE. PROVISIONS TO THIS EFFECT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED.

C. GUINEA REMAINED DEEPLY CONCERNED BY ACTIVE MILITARY THREAT FROM SENEGAL AND IVORY COAST. GOG HAD CERTAIN EVIDENCE OF PREPARATION QUOTE MERCENARY UNQUOTE TROOPS IN NIOKOLO KOBIA PARK IN SOUTHWEST SENEGAL AND IN THE VALLEYS OF THE NIMBA MASSIF IN NORTHWEST IVORY COAST. GOVERNMENTS OF SENEGAL AND IVORY COAST--OR AT LEAST THEIR PRESIDENTS--WERE SUPPORTING THESE AGGRESSIVE MILITARY PREPARATIONS. GOG WISHED FORMALLY TO REQUEST US TO GUARANTEE GUINEAN SECURITY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. AMERICA AND HER ALLIES HAD

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DECISIVE INFLUENCE UPON THE TWO THREATENING NEIGHBORS.

D. PRESIDENT TOURE WANTED US TO KNOW THERE HAD BEEN NO REPORT OF AMERICAN COMPLICITY IN ALL OF THE CONFESSIONS OBTAINED FROM CAPTURED PLOTTERS, FIFTH COLUMNISTS AND MERCENARIES. GOG HAD CONFIDENCE IN US INTEGRITY AND FRIENDSHIP. THE SOVIET FLIGHTS WOULD END, BUT PRESIDENT TOURE REQUESTED US HELP IN PRE-

VENTING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST GUINEA AND ASKED THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO REPORT THIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON. END OF GUINEAN PRESENTATION.

3. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION IT EMERGED THAT GUINEANS NO LONGER FEARED SEABORNE ATTACK. I EXPRESSED PERSONAL SKEPTICISM ABOUT THREAT FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, BUT ALL THREE MINISTERS EMOTIONALLY ASSURED ME THAT THEIR EVIDENCE WAS ABSOLUTE. FURTHERMORE, WHILE GOG HAD CONFIDENCE IN GISCARD D'ESTANG, FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT OR COULD NOT CONTROL ACTIVITIES WITHIN FRANCE OF GUINEAN OPPOSITION ELEMENTS OR OF FRENCH CITIZENS WHO REMAINED HOSTILE TO SEKOU TOURE. WHEN I ASKED WHAT GOG HAD IN MIND AS US GUARANTY OF SECURITY, WHICH STRUCK ME AS DIFFICULT AND VAGUE CONCEPT, DIAKITE SAID QUOTE COME, YOU ARE A DIPLOMAT AND KNOW HOW SUCH MATTERS CAN BE DISCUSSED WITH FRANCE AND THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED UNQUOTE.

4. COMMENT: WE APPEAR TO HAVE SCORED A REMARKABLE BREAK-THROUGH IN OBTAINING FLAT ASSURANCE OF CESSATION TU95D DEPLOYMENTS. THIS WAS A COURAGEOUS STEP FOR GOG TO TAKE WITH USSR AND SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED GUINEAN RESISTENCE TO SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY. GUINEAN REQUEST FOR US QUOTE SECURITY GUARANTY UNQUOTE DID NOT SEEM PRESENTED AS A CONDITION TO ENDING SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS. I BELIEVE GUINEANS DECIDED THAT SOVIETS WERE EXPLOITING THEM BY USING TU95D FLIGHTS AGAINST US RATHER THAN FOR GUINEAN SECURITY, AND SO FELT ABLE TO CLOSE THESE FLIGHTS OFF, ESPECIALLY SINCE INDEPENDENCE OF BISSAU HAD VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED DANGER OF ATTACK FROM SEA. PL480 MUST ALSO HAVE PROVIDED IMPORTANT LEVERAGE, ALTHOUGH DIAKITE CAREFULLY MADE NO REFERENCE  
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TO IT AND FOCUSED UPON SECURITY. GOG, BIZARRE AS IT MAY SEEM, IS VERY JITTERY ABOUT THE DANGER OF ATTACK FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. I BELIEVE TOURE UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY THREAT TO HIM WOULD BE NOT FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS BUT FROM THE MILLION OR SO EXILED GUINEANS: HOWEVER, HE IS CONVINCED THESE DISSIDENTS ARE RECEIVING SOME DEGREE OF SUPPORT--OR AT LEAST POSITIVE TOLERANCE--FROM HOUPHOUET AND SENHOR, AND PERHAPS FROM CERTAIN FRENCH AND WEST GERMAN INTERESTS. FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES HE IS OF COURSE EMPHASIZING THE FOREIGN THREAT, THE IMPERIALISTIC STOOGES, THE MERCENARIES AND NEOCOLONIALISTS.

5. RECOMMENDATION. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOW ENCOURAGE GUINEA TO PRESS THROUGH A MORE GENUINE NONALIGNED POLICY

AND TO RESIST SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF GUINEAN MILITARY FACILITIES AGAINST NATO INTERESTS. THIS MEANS, IN ADDITION TO FOOD AID, MAKING SOME GESTURE TO SHOW WE RECOGNIZE GUINEAN SECURITY CONCERNS JUST AS THEY ARE RESPONDING TO OURS. FOR EXAMPLE:

A. WE MIGHT COMPARE NOTES WITH THE FRENCH;

B. WE MIGHT OURSELVES, OR WITH THE FRENCH, DISCUSS THE SEKOU TOURE PROBLEM WITH HOUPHOUET AND SENGHOR. WE COULD SYMPATHIZE WITH THE ENDLESS ABUSE TO WHICH THEY ARE SUBJECT, BUT SAY WE ARE PERSUADED THAT TOURE ACTUALLY FEARS AN ATTACK FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. WE COULD ASK WHETHER THEY KNOW OF ANY ORGANIZED ANTI-TOURE REGIME ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF GUINEAN EXILES.

I WOULD EXPECT THEIR RESPONSES TO BE THE SORT OF INDIGNANT ASSURANCES WHICH WE COULD TRANSMIT TO TOURE. HE WOULD THEN HAVE THE SATISFACTION OF FEELING THAT US HAD INTERVENED ON HIS BEHALF AND THAT HIS NEIGHBORS KNEW OF US INTEREST IN THESE PROBLEMS. I BELIEVE THIS EXERCISE COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID OFFENSE TO OUR FRIENDS HOUPHOUET AND SENGHOR. WE MIGHT EVEN CONSIDER TELLING THEM THE TU95D STORY, SINCE THEY ARE AS CONCERNED AS ANYONE ABOUT COMMUNIST  
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MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA.

C. ANOTHER POSSIBLE US ACTION MIGHT BE TO SHOW TOURE SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE OF THE BORDER AREAS WHICH CONCERN HIM.

6. ON PRESUMPTION THAT SOVIET AIR DEPLOYMENT AGAINST US WILL REALLY END AFTER AUGUST, I RECOMMEND THAT GUINEA'S PROVISIONAL TITRICE ALLOCATION FOR FY77 BE RAISED TO 25,000 TONS, AND THAT WE PREPARE GROUNDWORK FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE PRIORITY ACTION ON FY77 AGREEMENT.

7. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT COMMENTS AND THOSE OF DAKAR AND ABIDJAN. HARROP

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